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STACKING OF UNINSURED* AND UNDERINSURED 
MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGES 
John G. Douglass** 
Francis E. Telegadas*** 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Often, the first question asked by a plaintiff's attorney in evalu-
ating a serious automobile accident case is, "How much insurance 
coverage is available?" That same question can pose perplexing is-
sues for defense attorneys or insurance counsel in assessing a cli-
ent's exposure to liability. In Virginia, these questions often re-
quire the attorney to consider the application of Virginia's 
Uninsured Motorist statutes and the import of "stacking" of 
coverage. 
The term "stacking" is broadly applied to the concept of adding 
(or multiplying) uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage 
available to an accident victim from multiple sources. The sources 
may consist of several different insurance policies or several differ-
ent coverages available under a single policy. 
For example, consider the case of a victim ("V''), who is insured 
under a policy with an Insurer ("!"), which has a statutory mini-
mum uninsured motorist limit of $25,000 per person. V's policy in-
sures three automobiles and he pays separate premiums for each. 
V drives one of his cars to work and is struck by the vehicle oper-
ated by Tortfeasor ("T"), who is uninsured. V's damages amount 
to $1 million. 
Is the case closed if I tenders $25,000, its apparent policy limits? 
Under principles of "stacking" established in Virginia, the answer 
is no. Unless V's policy explicitly excludes "stacking," V can multi-
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ply or "stack" the uninsured motorist coverages available to him 
from each of his three insured vehicles for a total of $75,000. As a 
result, I pays $75,000. 
Virginia cases address the stacking of both uninsured and under-
insured motorist coverage. The issue arises in cases of multiple pol-
icies or where multiple vehicles are insured under a victim's single 
policy. A related problem, though not typically defined as "stack-
ing," arises in determining the scope of coverage available to a vic-
tim injured by multiple tortfeasors, one or more of whom is unin-
sured or underinsured. 
This article begins with a brief introduction to Virginia's unin-
sured motorist statute. The article then addresses the stacking of 
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage and the problem of 
multiple tortfeasors. It also addresses the priority among insurers, 
where several uninsured motorist insurance carriers may be held 
liable for a single injury. The article closes with a summary of the 
most recent legislative and judicial pronouncements on the subject. 
A review of Virginia cases demonstrates that the result in almost 
any stacking problem is best determined by reference to a very 
simple rule: Read the Statute and Read the Policy! 
II. APPLICABLE STATUTES 
A. The Statute Governs All 
The fundamental premise governing uninsured and underin-
sured motorist insurance is that such insurance is a creature of 
statute. Virginia law compels any insurer offering coverage on 
automobiles principally garaged in the Commonwealth to provide 
certain types of coverage, including uninsured motorist coverage. 1 
Policy provisions which attempt to narrow or restrict coverage to 
anything less than that required by the statute are void. 2 
B. Uninsured Motorist Coverage Statute 
Section 38.2-2206 of the Code of Virginia provides in part: 
[N]o policy or contract of bodily injury or property damage liability 
insurance . . . shall be issued . . . unless it contains an endorsement 
or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums that he is 
1. VA. CODE ANN.§ 38.2-2206 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1989). 
2. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 900, 140 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1965). 
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legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of 
an uninsured motor vehicle, within limits not less than . . . 
[$25,000/$50,000]. 3 
The statute further provides that the uninsured motorist policy 
limits shall equal but not exceed the liability insurance limits 
under the policy.4 Accordingly, where the insured buys additional 
liability coverage he will automatically be provided, and must pay 
for, the higher uninsured motorist coverage, unless he elects in 
writing to maintain a lower limit of uninsured motorist coverage. 
C. Underinsured Motorist Coverage Statute 
1. 1974 SCC Policy Form 
Prior to 197 4, Virginia law did not provide for underinsured mo-
torist coverage. By Administrative Order 6840, March 19, 1974, the 
State Corporation Commission authorized an endorsement which 
provided that the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" be 
broadened to include "underinsured motor vehicle."5 
The authorized endorsement defined "underinsured motor 
vehicle:" 
When used in reference to this insurance (including this and other 
endorsements forming a part of the policy): "underinsured motor ve-
hicle" means a motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of which, as respects damages because of bodily injury 
or property damage or both, the sum of the limits of liability under 
all bodily injury and property damage liability bonds and insurance 
policies respectively applicable to bodily injury or property damage 
at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liabil-
ity under this insurance. 6 
2. Underinsured Motorist Coverage Added by Statute 
In 1982, Virginia amended its uninsured motorist statute to in-
clude a provision for underinsured motorist coverage. 7 The statute 
3. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 38.2-2206 (Repl. Vol1986 & Cum. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). 
4. Id. 
5. S.C.C. Order No. 6840 (1974). 
6. [d. 
7. 1982 Va. Acts 638, 642 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 38.2-2206 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. 
Supp. 1989)). 
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was amended in 1988, resulting in the following language currently 
in effect: 
Where the insured contracts for higher limits [than the statutory 
minimum of $25,000/$50,000], the endorsement or provisions for 
those limits shall obligate the insurer to make payment for bodily 
injury or property damage caused by the operation or use of an un-
derinsured motor vehicle to the extent the vehicle is underinsured, 
as defined in Subsection B of this section. 
B. 
A motor vehicle is "underinsured" when, and to the extent that, 
the total amount of bodily injury and property damage coverage ap-
plicable to the operation or use of the motor vehicle and available 
for payment for such bodily injury or property damage, including all 
bonds or deposits of money or securities made pursuant to Article 6 
(Section 46.1-467, et seq.) of Chapter 6 of Title 46.1, is less than the 
total amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded any person in-
jured as a result of the operation or use of the vehicle. 
"Available for payment" means the amount of liability insurance 
coverage applicable to the claim of the injured person for bodily in-
jury or _property damage reduced by the payment of any other 
claims arising out of the same occurrence. 8 
Note that the language, "available for payment," and the defini-
tion of that term were added by the 1988 amendment.9 The differ-
ence may make a difference!10 
3. Is Underinsured Coverage Always Mandated by Statute? 
Note that the statute does not say that an insurer must always 
include underinsured motorist coverage. It requires the insurer to 
do so only "where the insured contracts for higher limits" than the 
statutory minimum.11 The language of the statute, therefore, ap-
8. VA. ConE. ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Cum. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). 
9. Id. 
10. See infra notes 60·71 and accompanying text; see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Va. 1989) (noting difference between underinsurance pre-
July 1, 1987 and post-July 1, 1988 due to statutory amendments). Compare Billings v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp. 778, 783 (E.D. Va. 1988) with VA. ConE ANN.§ 38.2-
2206 (Cum. Supp. 1989). 
11. VA. ConE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Cum. Supp. 1989). 
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pears to permit an insurer who provides minimum coverage to use 
policy language more restrictive than that provided by the statute 
for insureds who purchase more than the minimum. The distinc-
tion is important where stacking multiplies otherwise minimum 
coverage.12 
D. Rules of Construction 
Applying typical contract principles, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia construes ambiguous insurance policy language against the 
insurer.13 The court also appears to pursue a policy of interpreting 
the uninsured motorist statute broadly to protect "the innocent 
victims of negligent uninsured motorists."14 
E. Which Statute Applies 
As statutory language is critical to any uninsured/underinsured 
motorist issue, the proper version of the statute must be applied. 
Note that section 38.2-2206 was amended in 1988, adding the lan-
guage "available for payment" to the definition of underinsured 
motorist coverage. The amendment went into effect on July 1, 
1988.111 
The new language applies only to insurance policies "issued or 
delivered" after July 1, 1988. A policy issued or delivered before 
that date would be valid if it contained the prior version of the 
statutory language, and would still govern claims arising after July 
1, 1988, during the term of the policy.16 
Ill. STACKING OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
A. Allowance of Stacking 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has explicitly approved stacking 
of uninsured motorist coverage in two contexts. First, stacking is 
allowed where the victim has uninsured motorist coverage availa-
12. See Hamblen v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., Law No. 2211 (Cir. Ct. Louisa County 1987); 
infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text; see also Bray v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 705 F. Supp. 
1145 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
13. E.g., Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 84, 189 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1972). 
14. Id. at 83, 189 S.E.2d at 323; accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 234 Va. 573, 
363 S.E.2d 703 (1988). 
15. VA. ConE ANN. § 38.2-2206 (Cum. Supp. 1989). 
16. !d. 
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ble from two or more separate policies of insurance.17 Second, 
stacking is allowed where the victim has two or more vehicles in-
sured under a single policy and pays separate premiums for each 
car.18 Stacking may be limited, however, at least in "single policy" 
cases, based upon explicit restrictions in the insurance policy.19 
Further, stacking is available only to certain classes of insureds. 20 
1. Stacking Coverage from Multiple Policies 
In Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,21 
the Supreme Court of Virginia permitted an accident victim to col-
lect under each of two separate insurance policies with uninsured 
motorist coverage available to the insured, where his damages 
would not be fully compensated by a single policy (or, as in Bry-
ant's case, even by the two policies combined). Bryant was driving 
his father's car when he was struck by an uninsured motorist.22 
Bryant obtained a judgment for $85,000 and sought to collect. 
State Farm had two policies with uninsured motorist coverage 
which applied. One was the father's policy on the vehicle, the other 
was Bryant's own policy.23 Each policy had a statutory minimum 
of $10,000 per person injured. State Farm paid under the primary 
coverage on the vehicle from the father's policy.24 State Farm 
claimed that the second policy was not applicable because it con-
tained an "other insurance" clause which made it only excess cov-
erage to the extent its limits exceeded the other policy's limits.25 
The supreme court held that Bryant was allowed to collect 
under both policies for a total of $20,000.26 The rationale used by 
the court is simple. Section 38.1-381(a) and (b) (now section 38.2-
2206) of the Code of Virginia27 provides that all policies must re-
quire the insurer to pay "all sums which [the insured] shall be le-
gally entitled to recover as damages" from the uninsured 
17. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965). 
18. Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972). 
19. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borror, 221 Va. 967, 275 S.E.2d 625 (1981). 
20. Cunningham, 213 Va. at 75-76, 189 S.E.2d at 834-36. 
21. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965). 
22. Id. at 898, 140 S.E.2d at 817-18. 
23. Id. at 898, 140 S.E.2d at 818. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 902, 140 S.E.2d at 820. 
27. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 38.2-2206 (Cum. Supp. 1989) (formerly VA. CoDE ANN.§ 38.1-381(a), 
(b) (1950)). 
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tortfeasor.28 The "excess insurance" provision in the policy at-
tempted to restrict the insurer's liability to something less than 
"all sums." Accordingly, the restriction was invalid.29 
2. Stacking Coverage for Multiple Vehicles Under a Single Policy 
In Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of North America,30 the court 
permitted an insured to stack uninsured motorist coverage availa-
ble on each of his three vehicles, insured under a single policy, 
even though his three vehicles were not involved in the accident. 31 
Cunningham, a state employee, was a passenger in a state vehicle 
which collided with an uninsured driver. Cunningham's personal 
auto insurance with Insurance Company of North America 
("INA") covered his three personal autos, each with $15,000/ 
$30,000 uninsured motorist limits. Cunningham paid separate, 
equal premiums for each of the three vehicles. 32 
The court "stacked" the INA coverages and held that a "named 
insured" has available uninsured motorist coverage both while in 
his insured vehicle and "wherever else he may happen to be when 
he suffers bodily injury due to an uninsured motorist."33 Further, 
the court held that where the insured pays separate premiums for 
coverage on separate cars, he is entitled to multiple coverages, even 
if the coverages are contained in a single insurance policy.34 
B. Limitations on Stacking Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
1. Two "Classes" of Insureds 
While Cunningham approved stacking of coverage where a single 
policy covered multiple vehicles, it also limited such stacking to a 
class of "named insureds." The issue arose when Cunningham 
tried to stack the coverage available upon the state-owned vehicle 
in which he was a passenger. The state's policy, with Maryland 
28. Bryant, 205 Va. at 901, 140 S.E.2d at 820. 
29. Id. The Bryant decision explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's decision in Travelers 
Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963). Id. 
30. 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972). 
31. Id. at 79, 189 S.E.2d at 837. 
32. Id. at 73, 189 S.E.2d at 833. 
33. I d. at 76, 189 S.E.2d at 835 (quoting Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 791, 
463 P.2d 38, 40 (1969)). 
34. I d. at 79, 189 S.E.2d at 837; see also Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 
129 S.E.2d 651 (1963); Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 212 Va. 162, 183 S.E.2d 
145 (1971) (both cases cover stacking of medical payments coverage). 
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Casualty, covered 4,368 state vehicles, each with separate 
premiums.311 
The supreme court did not permit such stacking where Cunning-
ham was not a "named insured" under the state's policy (i.e., a 
person named in the policy or a relative or member of house-
hold).36 The rationale was twofold. First, the statute (then section 
38.1-381(a)) defined "insured" in two classes. A "named insured" 
(the "first class") was covered whether in the insured car or not.37 
Other persons (the "second class") were covered only when using 
the car.38 Therefore, the only uninsured motorist coverage availa-
ble to Cunningham under the state's insurance policy was the cov-
erage on the single car he was in. Coverage on the other cars was 
not available to him and thus could not be stacked. 39 
2. Exclusion of Stacking in Policy Language-Single Policy 
Where a single policy insures multiple vehicles, the policy may 
effectively exclude stacking without violating Virginia's statute, 
but only if the exclusionary language is clear and explicit.40 
The supreme court in Goodville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bor-
ror,41 found the following language sufficient to exclude stacking. 
Limits of Liability 
Regardless of the number of . . . motor vehicles to which this insur-
ance applies: 
(a) the limit of liability for bodily injury stated in the schedule as 
applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's liability for 
all damages because of bodily injury sustained by one person as the 
result of any one accident and, subject to the above provision re-
specting "each person", the limits of liability stated in the schedule 
as applicable to "each accident" is the total limit of the company's 
35. Cunningham, 213 Va. at 74, 189 S.E.2d at 834. Note that if stacking had been allowed 
on all 4,368 state owned vehicles, it would have resulted in a $65 million policy limit for 
each state car. See id. 
36. Id. at 77, 189 S.E.2d at 835. 
37. Id.; see also supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Cunningham 
case). 
38. Cunningham, 213 Va. at 77, 189 S.E.2d at 835-36. 
39. Id. at 77, 189 S.E.2d at 835. For cases defining who is "using" an automobile to be 
entitled to uninsured or underinsured coverage compare, Insurance Co. of North America v. 
Perry, 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1964) with Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Cassell, 15 Va. Cir. 214 
(1988). The Cassell case is presently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
40. Goodville Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Borror, 221 Va. 967, 275 S.E.2d 625 (1981). 
41. Id. 
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liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained by two or 
more persons as the result of any one accident.42 
Most Virginia policies now contain such language. Less specific 
language may be insufficient to preclude stacking.43 
3. Exclusion of Stacking Between Multiple Policies 
Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.44 pro-
hibits language that would permit one insurer to exclude uninsured 
motorist coverage where other coverage is available.45 After Bry-
ant, it is difficult to conceive of policy language that could lawfully 
exclude stacking in cases of multiple policies. 
IV. STACKING oF UNDERINSURED MoTORIST CoVERAGE 
The principles applied to issues of stacking underinsured motor-
ist coverage are no different than those applied to uninsured mo-
torist coverage. However, the underinsurance debate is marked by 
a "chicken and egg" problem that does not arise with the unin-
sured motorist. Do you compare policy limits first and then stack 
coverage? Or, do you stack coverage first and then compare policy 
limits? 
Consider the following example. Tortfeasor ("T') has a policy 
with a $25,000 limit. Victim ("V"), who has sustained damages ex-
ceeding $1 million, has a policy with a $25,000 limit on each of 
three cars, under a single policy that does not explicitly exclude 
stacking. If policy limits are considered first, T is not "underin-
sured," because T's limits are the same as V's. Therefore, even if 
you "stack" the coverage, V gets nothing, since three times nothing 
is still nothing. If stacking of coverage is considered first, however, 
V has $75,000 coverage and Tis therefore "underinsured" to the 
extent of $50,000. V collects $50,000 from his uninsured motorist 
carrier. 
The answer to the riddle lies in the language of the policy and of 
the statute. Because of amendments to the statute, however, it is 
critical to know which version of the statute should be applied. 
42. Id. at 970, 275 S.E.2d at 627. 
43. See Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972). 
44. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965). 
45. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29. 
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A. Mitchell and the 1974 SCC Endorsement-Compare First 
and Stack Later 
Mitchell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.46 
posed the "chicken and egg" problem in determining underin-
surance coverage under the 1974 sec standard endorsement.47 
The Tortfeasor ("T'') had $50,000 liability limits. Mitchell's hus-
band insured three cars under three separate policies, each with 
$25,000 limits. Plaintiff sought to stack the three coverages for 
$75,000 total coverage, then to compare her coverage to T's $50,000 
in order to conclude the T was underinsured by $25,000 (i.e., stack 
first, compare later).48 Instead, the supreme court compared 
Mitchell's $25,000 limit on each policy to T's $50,000 limit and 
found that, with respect to each of Mitchell's policies, T was not 
underinsured. 49 
The result turned on the language of the 197 4 endorsement 
which defined "underinsured motor vehicle" as one where "the 
sum of the limits of liability . . . applicable to bodily injury . . . is 
less than the applicable limits of liability under this insurance."50 
The supreme court found "this insurance" to mean the coverage 
provided by the policy to which the endorsement was attached. 
The court stated that "[i]t follows that each of the Mitchell's poli-
cies must be considered independently to determine whether 
[Tortfeasor] was underinsured."51 In somewhat broader language, 
the court added that "[f]or a plaintiff with minimum coverage, 
therefore, the underinsured motorist endorsement is worthless."52 
Note that it is unclear whether the result in Mitchell would have 
been different if Mitchell insured all three cars under one policy. 
Would the court define "this insurance" as the whole policy (i.e., 
three coverages of $25,000, totalling $75,000), or would "this insur-
ance" be construed to mean the specific coverage for each vehicle? 
46. 227 Va. 452, 318 S.E.2d 288 (1984). 
47. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
48. Mitchell, 227 Va. at 453, 318 S.E.2d at 288. 
49. Id. at 459, 318 S.E.2d at 292. 
50. Id. at 458-59, 318 S.E.2d at 291-92 (emphasis added). 
51. Id. at 459, 318 S.E.2d at 292. 
52. Id. 
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B. Finding and Stacking Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
Under the Virginia Statute 
The 1982 amendments to Virginia's uninsured motorist statute 
would change the result in Mitchell, if Mitchell had been insured 
under a policy containing language required by the statute. The 
statute now provides that a vehicle is underinsured "when, and to 
the extent that, the total amount of bodily injury . . . coverage 
applicable to the . . . use of the motor vehicle and available for 
payment . . . is less than the total amount of uninsured motorist 
coverage afforded any person injured as a result of the operation 
... [of such] vehicle."63 Instead of comparing the tortfeasor's cov-
erage separately to each coverage available to the victim, the stat-
ute compares the tortfeasor's coverage to the "total amount" of un-
insured motorist coverage available to the victim. In other words, 
stack first, compare later. 
C. Circuit Court Rulings 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not considered stacking of 
underinsured motorist coverage since the statute was amended to 
define "underinsured motorist" in 1982. Three Circuit Court of 
Virginia decisions, however, have applied the statute by stacking 
coverages available to a victim from separate policies and then 
comparing that total coverage to the tortfeasor's in order to deter-
mine the extent of underinsurance. 64 
D. Nonmandatory Application of Statutory Definition of 
"Underinsured" 
The Virginia statute only obligates an insurer to provide under-
insured motorist coverage, as defined in section 38.2-2206, in cases 
"[w]here the insured contracts for higher limits" than the mini-
mum.66 Accordingly, where the insured buys only the minimum, 
the statute apparently does not require his policy to include under-
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp 1989) (emphasis added) (the language 
"available for payment" was added in the 1988 amendments to the act). 
54. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 12 Va. Cir. 360 (1988); Herbecq v. Virginia 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 12 Va. Cir. 88 (1987); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Turnage, No. 85C1208 (Cir. 
Ct. Henrico County, Va. Apr. 11, 1986). A good discussion of the Herbecq and the Turnage 
case can be found in Billings v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins Co., 680 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D. 
Va. 1988). 
55. VA. CoDE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A) (Cum. Supp 1989). 
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insured motorist coverage. 
Since most policies are standard forms, regardless of the limits, 
and since most forms track the statute, the issue may seldom arise. 
The issue did arise in Hamblen v. Valley Forge Insurance Co.56 
where the insured had minimum limits under a policy which still 
used the 1974 State Corporation Commission endorsement defini-
tion of "underinsured motorist." The insured argued that the en-
dorsement was void since it was more restrictive than the statute. 57 
The court ruled that the statutory definition of "underinsured mo-
torist" only applied "where the insured contracts for higher lim-
its."58 The Mitchell analysis (i.e., compare limits first, then stack) 
therefore applied, and the court found no underinsurance. 59 
E. Underinsurance Where the Tortfeasor Pays Other 
Claims-Problems of Multiple Victims 
1. Before 1988 Amendment 
An underinsured motorist issue arises where a tortfeasor's cover-
age is depleted by payment to one of several victims. In Billings v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,60 for example, the 
tortfeasor's $25,000 coverage was depleted by payment of $2,250 to 
another victim. The court determined that, despite this depletion, 
the amount of coverage applicable to the tortfeasor's vehicle was 
$25,000.61 The court then compared that $25,000 to the coverage 
available to the victim in order to determine the amount of 
underinsurance. 62 
Note that an additional problem can arise under the pre-1988 
statute. For example, tortfeasor ("T') has "split level" ($25,000/ 
$50,000) coverage and there are two victims, A and B, each with 
$100,000 uninsured motorist coverage available to him. If A com-
pares his available coverage to "the total amount of bodily injury 
56. Law No. 2211 (Cir. Ct. Louisa County 1987). 
57. ld. 
58. ld. 
59. I d.; see also Bray v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 705 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1989) (stacking 
of underinsured motorist coverage precluded where there was a single policy covering more 
than one vehicle and the policy contained language limiting the liability of the insurer). 
60. 680 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
61. Id. at 784. The court relied upon Tudor v. Allstate Ins. Co., 216 Va. 918, 224 S.E.2d 
156 (1976) for its holding. See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 
676 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
62. Billings, 680 F. Supp. at 784. 
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... applicable to the operation or use of [the tortfeasor's] motor 
vehicle,"63 as provided by statute, then you would compare 
$100,000 to $50,000 (total coverage available per accident in case of 
multiple victims), and find T underinsured to the extent of 
$50,000. If A compares his $100,000 to T's coverage available to A, 
he gets $75,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. The literal lan-
guage of the pre-1988 statute supports the $50,000 result.64 
2. After 1988 Amendment-Compare Tortfeasor's Coverage 
"Available for Payment" 
The 1988 amendment adds the phrase, "available for payment" 
to the statute.611 Now, the victim compares his coverage only to 
that portion of the tortfeasor's coverage that is "available for pay-
ment" to him. "Available for payment" is defined as "[t]he amount 
of liability insurance coverage applicable to the claim of the in-
jured person for bodily injury or property damage reduced by the 
payment of any other claims arising out of the same occurrence. "66 
The new statute changes the result in Billings.67 Now, the victim 
compares his coverage to the tortfeasor only after reducing the 
tortfeasor's coverage by any amount paid to other claimants. 
Under the new statute, the Billings tortfeasor, whose insurer paid 
$2,250 on a $25,000 policy, would be underinsured to the extent of 
$27,250 (i.e., $50,000 minus $22,750).68 
The new statute also addresses the "split level" problem posed 
above.69 The new statute compares the victims' coverage only to 
the portion of the tortfeasor's coverage that is "applicable to the 
claim of the injured person." Each victim in the example in Part 
E-1 above, therefore, would be uninsured to the extent of $75,000. 
The "available for payment" language in the 1988 statute elimi-
nates another problem which existed because of the treatment of 
"property damage" coverage under a literal reading of the 1982 
statute. The 1982 version of the statute stated that a motor vehicle 
was underinsured: 
63. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 32.2-2206(B) (Repl. Vol. 1986) (prior to July 1, 1988 
amendment). 
64. See id. 
65. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1989). 
66. Id. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62. 
68. See Billings v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
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[W]hen, and to the extent that the total amount of bodily injury 
and property damage coverage applicable to the operation or use of 
the motor vehicle . . . is less than the total amount of uninsured 
motorist coverage afforded any person injured as a result of the op-
eration or use of the vehicle.70 
One commentator has put forth the following scenario: 
[A]ssume liability coverage of a defendant of $25,000 per person 
and $50,000 per accident for bodily injury, and $10,000 per accident 
for property damage. Further, assume uninsured motorist coverage 
of a plaintiff of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident for 
bodily injury, and $25,000 for property damage per accident . . . . 
The total amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded any per-
son injured as a result of the operation or use of the vehicle" is 
$100,000. The "total amount of bodily injury and property damage 
coverage applicable to the operation or use of the motor vehicle" is 
$60,000-the per accident limits for bodily injury and property 
damage. 
Therefore, to the extent that $100,000 exceeds $60,000, the motor 
vehicle involved is underinsured. The underinsured coverage is 
$40,000.71 
The 1988 amendments clarify this situation and mandate under-
insurance of $75,000 ($100,000 minus the $25,000 "available for 
payment"). 
F. Policy Language Excluding Stacking 
Policy language explicitly excluding stacking is applicable in un-
derinsured motorist cases, just as in uninsured motorist cases. Bill-
ings applied the reasoning of Goodville Mutual Casualty Co. v. 
Borror, in the underinsured motorist context.72 Note that Billings, 
like Goodville, deals with exclusionary language in a single policy 
covering several vehicles. Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co.,73 would prohibit such exclusions in cases of 
70. VA. ConE ANN.§ 38.2-2206(B) (Rep!. Vol. 1986). 
71. West, Calculating Underinsurance Coverage Limits, 1 J. Crv. LIT. 17 (1989) (emphasis 
added). 
72. Billings, 680 F. Supp. at 781 (construing Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borror, 221 Va. 
967, 275 S.E.2d 625 (1981)). 
73. 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d at 817 (1965). 
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multiple policies. 
V. PROBLEMS OF MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS 
The amount of underinsured motorist coverage available to an 
accident victim can change where multiple tortfeasors in separate 
vehicles are jointly liable for the injury. Total uninsured or under-
insured motorist coverage, however, will not exceed the victim's 
policy limits, regardless of the number of underinsured vehicles.74 
A. Calculating Underinsurance Coverage with Multiple 
Tortfeasors 
In cases involving two or more underinsured defendants in sepa-
rate vehicles, courts must calculate underinsurance coverage by 
comparing the victim's coverage to that of each underinsured vehi-
cle, then aggregate such coverage, not to exceed the victim's unin-
sured motorist coverage limits.75 
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Scott,76 the plaintiff had 
$100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage with Nationwide. Defend-
ant A had $25,000 liability coverage. Defendant B had $50,000 cov-
erage. Plaintiff obtained a $1 million judgment and collected 
$25,000 from A and $50,000 from B. The court found A underin-
sured in the amount of $75,000, and B in the amount of $50,000, 
for a total of $125,000.77 Nationwide therefore was required to pay 
$100,000, the amount of its limits.78 The court held that Nation-
wide was not entitled to "set off'' the $75,000 collected by plaintiff 
from defendants' insurers.79 
The decision stems from the language of the statute, which re-
quires an insurer to pay all damages caused by an underinsured 
motor vehicle to the full extent "such vehicle" is underinsured.80 
74. See Drewry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Va. 231, 129 S.E.2d 681 (1963). 
75. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scott, 234 Va. 573, 363 S.E.2d 703 (1988). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 575, 363 S.E.2d at 704. 
78. Id. at 576, 363 S.E.2d at 705. 
79. Id. at 577, 363 S.E.2d at 705. 
80. Id. 
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B. One Insured Defendant and One Uninsured or Underinsured 
The "no set off'' principle which Scott applies with respect to 
two underinsured vehicles applies as well to cases where one 
tortfeasor's vehicle is insured and the other tortfeasor's is unin-
sured or underinsured. If the victim collects the available coverage 
from the insured tortfeasor and his judgment is still unsatisfied, he 
may collect his uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist cover-
age from his insurer, up to his policy limit or until his judgment is 
satisfied. 81 
C. Policy Limits Not Increased by Multiple Tortfeasors 
The victim's recovery from his uninsured motorist carrier is sub-
ject to the limit set forth in his policy (adjusted for stacking, in the 
case of multiple policies or multiple vehicles). The fact that multi-
ple uninsured vehicles may have inflicted his injury will not affect 
his policy limits. 82 The purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is 
to provide the insured protection up to his chosen (and paid for) 
policy limits. The purpose is not to provide coverage to uninsured 
motorists. 83 
VI. PRIORITY BETWEEN INSURANCES WHERE COVERAGE AVAILABLE 
FRoM MuLTIPLE SouRcEs 
A. Insured Defendant's Limits Sufficient to Pay Judgment 
Against Both the Insured Defendant and Uninsured Defendant 
Where an insured defendant's liability limits are sufficient to 
pay the judgment, and the injured party collects judgment from 
that carrier, there is no right of contribution in favor of the liabil-
ity carrier against the uninsured motorist carrier.84 The rationale is 
that the uninsured motorist statute does not create insurance for 
the uninsured motorist, but instead insures the victim against in-
adequate compensation.85 
81. Scott, 273 Va. at 573, 363 S.E.2d at 703; Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
375 F.2d 720, 722 n.2 (4th Cir. 1967) (citing White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 785 
(4th Cir. 1966)). 
82. Drewry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Va. 231, 129 S.E.2d 681 (1963). 
83. Id. at 238, 129 S.E.2d at 685-86. 
84. Southern Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 236 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Va. 1964); Hobbs v. 
Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Va. 1962). 
85. See Southern, 236 F. Supp. at 372. 
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A plaintiff can, however, choose the insurance company from 
which he desires to collect the judgment. 86 In one recent case, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff can 
seek satisfaction from his own insurance carrier under the unin-
sured motorist coverage before exhausting the tortfeasor's liability 
insurance.87 His insurer, however, would have a right of subroga-
tion against the tortfeasor and could collect from the tortfeasor's 
insurer. 
B. One Insured Defendant and One Uninsured, Where Judg-
ment Exceeds Liability Coverage of Defendant88 
This was the case in Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.89 The insured can collect from both the tortfeasor 
and his own insurer, up to the total amount of the judgment, with-
out set-off, but subject to the victim's uninsured motorist limit of 
liability.90 The victim's insurer would have a right of subrogation 
against the tortfeasor, but only after the victim received full 
compensation. 91 
C. Multiple Uninsured Motorist Coverages Applicable to Single 
Injury 
The court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
United Service Automobile Association92 held that the uninsured 
motorist coverage on a vehicle occupied by the victim is primary to 
the other applicable uninsured motorist coverages. In State Farm-, 
both policies had a clause mandating that the insurance on the ve-
hicle was primary and other coverage was secondary. The court 
found the policy provisions valid under the Virginia statute. 93 
This result is now mandated by statute in underinsurance cases. 
The 1988 amendment provides: 
If an injured person is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage 
under more than one policy, the following order of priority of poli-
86. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1986). 
87. !d. at 273. 
88. Id. at 274. 
89. 375 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1967). See supra text accompanying note 81. 
90. Id. at 722 n.2. 
91. White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 785, 787 (4th Cir. 1966). 
92. 211 Va. 133, 176 S.E.2d 327 (1970). 
93. Id. at 138, 176 S.E.2d at 331. 
1 
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cies applies and any amount available for payment shall be credited 
against such policies in the following order of priority: 
1. The policy covering a motor vehicle occupied by the injured 
person at the time of the accident; 
2. The policy covering a motor vehicle not involved in the acci-
dent under which the injured person is the named insured; 
3. The policy covering a motor vehicle not involved in the acci-
dent under which the injured person is an insured other than a 
named insured. 
Where there is more than one insurer providing coverage under 
one of the payment priorities set forth, their liability shall be pro-
portioned as to their respective underinsured motorist coverages.9 ' 
VII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Legislative Action 
The General Assembly in the 1989 session considered an amend-
ment to section 38.2-2206(A) of the Code of Virginia which would 
have mandated stacking under one policy insuring multiple vehi-
cles. 95 The bill would have added the following paragraph to the 
end of section 38.2-2206(A): 
In any such policy of motor vehicle insurance in which the insured 
has purchased uninsured coverage pursuant to this section, every in-
surer providing such uninsured motorist coverage arising from the 
ownership, maintenance or use of not more than four motor vehicles 
shall be liable to pay up to the maximum policy limit available on 
every motor vehicle insured under such coverage, where all sums 
that the insured is legally entitled to recover as damages from the 
owner or operator of an insured or underinsured motor vehicle ex-
ceed the limits of coverage for any one motor vehicle so insured.98 
The proposed amendment would have invalidated policy lan-
guage such as that approved in Goodville Mutual Casualty Co. v. 
Borror,97 which excluded stacking of coverage within a single pol-
icy. The bill passed the House of Delegates, but was defeated when 
94. VA. ConE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp. 1989). 
95. See H.B. 1733, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1989 Session (1989). 
96. Id. 
97. 221 Va. 967, 275 S.E.2d 625 (1981). 
1989] STACKING MOTOR VEHICLE COVERAGES 105 
it came out of the Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor on 
February 15, 1989 with a negative recommendation.98 
B. Federal Decisions 
Two decisions from the Norfolk division of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in early 1989 ad-
dressed stacking of uninsured and underinsured law motorist cov-
erage. In Bray v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania,99 the victim was a 
truck driver who owned his tractor and leased it to a trucking firm. 
The trucking firm maintained a $1 million insurance policy on the 
tractor and trailer, as mandated by federal ICC regulations.100 The 
victim had personal coverage on three automobiles on one policy, 
25/50 on the first vehicle, 100/300 on the second vehicle and 25/50 
on the third vehicle. That policy contained exclusionary language 
which prohibited intra-policy stacking.101 The victim was involved 
in an accident with a vehicle covered by a total of $50,000 for the 
accident.102 The victim sought to gain underinsurance coverage 
from the $1 million policy and sought to stack his personal policy 
coverage.103 
The court first decided that the $1 million policy on the tractor 
did not cover the victim.104 The policy provided that uninsured 
coverage only applied to "owned vehicles" which did not include 
vehicles leased to the trucking firm: 105 The court then stated that 
uninsured motorist coverage of a policy was not mandated by stat-
ute because the statute only mandates coverage for the owner of 
the vehicle and his permissive users. The statute did not mandate 
such coverage for leased vehicles and the permissive user of leased 
vehicles. 106 
The court then examined whether the $1 million policy on the 
trailer owned by the trucking firm applied to cover the incident. 
The court found it did not, rejecting plaintiff's argument that he 
98. See Insurance Stacking Suffers Defeats in Court, Legislature, Va. Law. Weekly, Feb. 
20, 1989, at 1, col. 4. 
99. 705 F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1151, 1154. 
104. Jd. at 1149-50. 
105. Id. 
106. I d. at 1150. The Bray case underscores the necessity of reading not only the statute, 
but also the policy. 
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was underinsured as to the $1 million policy.107 Underinsurance 
only applies where: one, the named insured purchases greater lia-
bility coverage than required by law, and two, the named insured 
has not rejected uninsured/underinsured coverage.108 Since federal 
law under the ICC regulations requires higher limits than Virginia 
law, the trucking firm was purchasing the coverage "required by 
law" (i.e., $1 million) and no more.109 Therefore, the statutory lan-
guage triggering underinsurance was not met. 
Finally, the court noted that the victim could not stack his per-
sonal coverage. The policy contained the Goodville exclusion and 
the victim was allowed only to calculate underinsurance by the 
largest amount of coverage he had on one vehicle, the $100,000 
coverage.110 
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. John-
son,m decided by Judge Clarke, the liability carrier paid other 
claims before the victim's, depleting the $100,000 in insurance to 
just over $3,000.112 National Union, the victim's uninsured/under-
insured motorist carrier, argued that the victim would have to ob-
tain a judgment over $100,000 to tap any underinsurance cover- -
age. 113 The court agreed, but noted that the outcome would be 
different under the post-July 1, 1988 amendments.114 
The court's analysis is subject to question, since it appears to 
confuse the issue of coverage with the issue of collection. The auto-
mobile of the tortfeasor, Johnson, clearly was "underinsured," as 
defined by the 1982 statute. The coverage "applicable to the opera-
tion" of Johnson's vehicle ($100,000) was less than the "total 
amount of uninsured motorist coverage afforded" the victim, Man-
ning ($500,000). Accordingly, under the 1982 statutory definition, 
Johnson's car was "underinsured" to the extent of $400,000.115 The 
court apparently agreed with that conclusion, 116 but nevertheless 
107. Id. at 1151-54. 
108. Id. at 1153. 
109. !d. at 1153-54. This is the first reported decision upholding Judge Harkrader's views 
expressed in Hamblen, discussed in text accompanying notes 56-59. 
110. Bray, 705 F. Supp. at 1154. 
111. 709 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
112. Id. at 677. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 680. 
115. Under the 1988 statute, it would have been underinsured to the extent of $497,000. 
116. See 709 F. Supp. at 679 ("Mr. Manning clearly meets the statutory definition of 
'underinsured' .... "). 
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found that Manning must obtain judgment in excess of $100,000 
"before he may look to the [uninsured motorist coverage]." The 
result·would leave Manning with no coverage for the portion of his 
claim above $3,000 but below $100,000. 
Contrary to the court's opinion, a literal reading of the statute 
does not mandate this result. Pursuant to the statute, whenever 
the tortfeasor's vehicle is "underinsured," as Johnson's was, the 
uninsured motorist policy must "obligate the insurer to make pay-
ments for bodily injury . . . caused by the operation or use of an 
underinsured motor vehicle to the extent the vehicle is underin-
sured .... "117 The statute does not require that the victim look 
solely to the tortfeasor's liability insurer for any recovery up to 
that insurer's amount of liability. 
C. State Farm v. Pessar: Reaffirmation of the Goodville Rule 
In Pessar v. State Farm Fire & Casualty,118 the victim (Pessar) 
obtained a verdict of $500,000 against an uninsured motorist. Pes-
sar was driving a car which had $100,000 of uninsured motorist 
coverage. He also owned four motorcycles insured under a separate 
policy. The uninsured motorist coverage applicable to each motor-
cycle under the second policy was $100,000. The policy had the 
same language preventing intra-policy stacking that was found in 
the Goodville case. The plaintiff paid a separate premium for each 
uninsured motorist coverage on each motorcycle.119 
The plaintiff successfully argued to the circuit court that the 
payment of separate premiums created an ambiguity and therefore 
the Goodville limitation clause was "not clear and unambigu-
ous."~20 In an unpublished summary order, the supreme court re-
versed the circuit court's decision.121 The court noted that the pol-
icy language in Pessar was identical to that found in Goodville and 
accordingly, there could be no stacking.122 The court's analysis ac-
cords with language in the Goodville decision which states that 
payments of separate premiums would not undermine clear and 
117. VA. CoDE ANN,§ 38.2-2206 (Repl. Vol. 1986). 
118. No. CL 87-1931 (Va. Beach Cir. Ct. 1988). 
119. Id. at-
120. See Brief of Appellant in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pessar, No. 880462 (Va. 
1989). 
121. Va. Law. Weekly, Nov. 27, 1989, at 1, col. 1. 
122. Id. 
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unambiguous language preventing intra-policy stacking.123 
VIII. CoNCLUSION 
The supreme court's action in Pessar, coupled with the defeat of 
legislation proposed in 1989, leave intact an insurer's ability to ex-
clude stacking of coverage within a single policy. Not surprisingly, 
the exclusive language approved in Goodville now appears verba-
tim in most policies issued in Virginia. 
Stacking in cases of multiple policies, however, continues to give 
rise to complex issues regarding the extent of available coverage. 
The possibilities are limited only by the "happenstance" of auto-
mobile accidents. Regardless of the issue, however, the uninsured 
motorist statute remains the focus of all analysis. There is simply 
no substitute for a careful and precise reading of the statute. 
123. Goodville, 221 Va. at 971, 275 S.E.2d at 628. See also Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 
213 Va. 81, 89 S.E. 2d 320 (1972), and Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 
Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972), where the court never considered that payment of separate 
premiums would obviate clear and unambiguous language excluding stacking. 
